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Living with the COVID-19 pandemic: act now with the tools 
we have
The responses of countries to the COVID-19 pandemic 
have been disparate.1,2 Many countries are reopening 
workplaces, schools, and social gatherings and striving to 
adapt their economies and resume international travel. 
Other countries are attempting to suppress transmission 
of severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 
(SARS-CoV-2) by again restricting businesses, industries, 
and schools while hoping for future COVID-19 vaccines 
or treatments. The Strategic and Technical Advisory 
Group for Infectious Hazards (STAG-IH), the independent 
advisory group to the WHO Health Emergencies 
Programme, has reviewed information from countries 
around the world and has concluded that the most sound 
approach on the basis of current understanding is to 
deploy long-term strategies with a focus on preventing 
amplification of transmission, protecting those most at 
risk of severe illness, and supporting research to better 
understand the virus, the disease, and people’s responses 
to them.
Evidence suggests that children shed SARS-CoV-2 
as do adults, mostly with non-severe clinical 
presentations.3 But many characteristics of SARS-CoV-2 
are not yet fully understood, such as the levels of 
immunity and the immune response, the full spectrum 
of disease and long-term sequelae, the possibility of 
re-infection,4,5 and the potential of the virus to become 
endemic. Until more is known about the immune 
response to SARS-CoV-2, it is not possible to make 
sound predictions.
SARS-CoV-2 does not seem to behave epidemi-
ologically like influenza virus and continues to resurge 
in clusters or outbreaks, not always in waves with rapid 
widespread community transmission.6 With a more 
precise and epidemiologically based public health 
response involving active case finding, contact tracing, 
and strategic testing strategies, outbreaks caused by 
SARS-CoV-2 can be contained and community spread 
decreased to a more manageable level.7 Some countries 
in Asia and Europe (eg, South Korea, Japan, Hong Kong, 
Singapore, Vietnam, and Germany)1,2 have shown 
that this approach keeps transmission at sustainably 
lower and safer levels than in countries not following 
this approach, thus preventing surges of patients in 
health facilities and decreasing overall mortality.2 This 
approach is based on three principles: understanding, 
trust, and participation by all population groups; 
decreased transmission of SARS-CoV-2 using basic 
epidemiological and public health interventions; and 
acknowledging that any potential COVID-19 vaccines 
and treatments will only be part of the solution and 
that they will best perform in conjunction with a long-
term overall public health strategy. The components 
of this epidemiologically based public health response 
to the COVID-19 pandemic (panel)8 are familiar to 
public health specialists, but have been neglected or are 
inappropriately understood in some countries, both by 
leaders and the general public.
Alongside this comprehensive response, continued 
assessment is needed of how best to resume 
international travel. Most countries have focused on 
international travel as a risk for the (re)introduction of 
SARS-CoV-2 and use various risk-mitigation strategies 
(eg, PCR testing of international travellers and voluntary 
or mandatory isolation after arrival). Yet there is no 
optimum way to prevent importation of SARS-CoV-2, 
no matter how rigorously quarantine and testing 
are applied, because of the range in the SARS-CoV-2 
incubation period (2–14 days),11 the spectrum of disease 
(with subclinical and mild illness in many infected 
individuals), the fact that many travellers return to 
households with others who are not quarantined, and 
the number of days after infection to the time when PCR 
testing becomes positive. Other measures that could 
be equally or more effective include urging travellers 
to monitor their health and recommending they do 
not travel when ill; questioning travellers about their 
health status immediately before they travel; adhering 
to personal hygiene measures, physical distancing, and 
wearing masks in public when physical distancing is not 
possible; reporting illnesses to the destination country; 
and ensuring implementation of measures to provide 
safe travel environments. Introduction of digital smart 
tools might complement these measures and their 
evaluation should be continued.
Many countries consider that travel is safer from 
locations with low circulation of SARS-CoV-2 and strong 
Doctopic: Analysis and Interpretation
20TL17350
[PII_REPLACE]
Embargo: October 8, 2020—23:30 (BST)
Comment
2 www.thelancet.com   Published online October 8, 2020   https://doi.org/10.1016/PII
capacities for outbreak containment, and they are keen 
to obtain credible information about the infection 
and transmission status of other countries. Available 
WHO case reports are, however, based on laboratory-
confirmed SARS-CoV-2 infections and since testing 
strategies vary by country2 they are not an accurate 
indication of true transmission rates. Identification and 
use of more meaningful indicators of infection and 
transmission status are urgently required.
COVID-19 vaccines, therapeutics, and diagnostics 
are important for the pandemic response, and if any of 
the COVID-19 vaccine candidates are shown to be safe 
and effective, they will probably be deployed before 
full approval through emergency use authorisations 
or other strategies. Strategies must be developed 
to ensure equitable access through the COVAX pillar 
of the Access to COVID-19 Tools (ACT) Accelerator12 
and other mechanisms. In terms of treatments, use 
of glucocorticoids for critically ill patients is now 
best practice on the basis of evidence from clinical 
trials.13 Other therapeutics, including antivirals 
(nucleoside analogues and antibody preparations) and 
immunomodulators, continue to be investigated.14 
Multiple diagnostic tests for nucleic acid, antigen, and 
antibody are being evaluated, including by a partnership 
between WHO and the Foundation for Innovative New 
Diagnostics (FIND).15 As results of this research become 
available, countries will be able to make decisions about 
which tests meet their own standards and fit with their 
testing strategies. One example is the announcement 
by WHO, FIND, and The Global Fund to Fight AIDS, 
Tuberculosis and Malaria on the provision of externally 
validated, point-of-care rapid antigen detection 
diagnostic tests for SARS-CoV-2.16 As other diagnostic 
tests are externally validated, they must be made widely 
available through the ACT Accelerator and other access 
mechanisms. Despite the urgency of identifying effective 
therapeutics and vaccines for COVID-19, the rules of 
science and the ethics of clinical research do not change 
in the setting of a pandemic. The most effective way to 
develop vaccines and therapeutics is through trials with 
robust safety and efficacy endpoints.
With current knowledge, even in the absence of 
COVID-19 vaccines or treatments and comprehensive 
knowledge of the immune response to SARS-CoV-2, 
countries can navigate pathways to reduced trans-
mission, decreased severe illness and mortality, and 
less economic disruption in the short and longer term. 
Despite geopolitical tensions, information contributing 
to greater understanding of COVID-19 continues to 
be shared within the scientific community and with 
WHO. International travel is increasing, economic 
Panel: Checklist of the basic components of an epidemiologically sound public health 
response to COVID-19 pandemic
 Rapidly detect people with infection, outbreaks, and sites of increased 
transmission
Strengthen surveillance of influenza-like illness9 and acute respiratory tract infections 
and/or establish detection systems in health and other sectors, including schools, the 
homes of schoolchildren, and workplaces
 Isolate and manage people infected with SARS-CoV-2
Individuals who test positive for SARS-CoV-2 need to be isolated and managed at an 
appropriate level of care with best practices that incorporate evolving evidence
 Investigate outbreaks
Retrospective contact tracing and diagnostic testing, and/or serological surveys10 are 
needed to investigate outbreaks and understand where transmission is occurring
 Decrease community transmission
Prospective contact tracing and self-quarantine of contacts must be undertaken, with the 
use of testing in a way that ensures that those contacts who develop signs and symptoms 
of COVID-19 can be properly managed
 Strengthen control measures
Ensure individuals, communities, and organisations are fully engaged in control activities 
(eg, physical distancing, wearing masks, and handwashing and cough and sneeze etiquette) 
 Ensure that testing is strategic
Use highly sensitive and specific nucleic acid, antigen, and antibody tests linked to 
surveillance and contact tracing, patient diagnosis, and management
 Protect the health and social care system
Ensure that health facilities can accommodate the current disease burden and any disease 
occurring from future resurgence by protecting health workers and strengthening 
infection prevention and control practices; understanding the characteristics of high-risk 
groups and increasing their protection, especially in institutions such as care homes 
where they may live; and monitoring the health-care system to plan for and secure 
additional capacity if needs arise
 Continue mitigation of general risks
Prevent or de-risk large public gatherings and events
 Involve the business and private sectors
Engage with private sector in innovative ways to ensure a safe and productive workforce
 Apply short-term preventive and mitigation measures
Use these short-term measures, such as time-limited closures and restrictions where 
transmission is occurring, until transmission has been reduced or eliminated
 Conduct, fund, and support research
Research is crucial to better understand the characteristics of SARS-CoV-2, including the 
course of infection and the immune response; establish cohort studies to understand the 
extent of sequelae; and conduct qualitative studies to better understand and strengthen 
people’s response to COVID-19; at the same time, continued clinical research on vaccines, 
therapeutics, and diagnostics is also required
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and education sectors are reopening, and countries 
are benefiting from the experiences of others as they 
continue to live with the COVID-19 pandemic and 
develop more effective control strategies.
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